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Abstract
?This article mainly conducts a case study on Chinese?s repatriation to Burma from 1946 
to 1948 to discuss how the government of the Republic of China (ROC) managed the 
multi-level diplomatic strategy on overseas Chinese protection in its regime time (1912-
1949). The operation was the largest operation for overseas Chinese protection of the 
ROC Government in modern history of China but with limited previous academic works. 
By utilizing the unpublished primary archives, the author concentrates on the diplomatic 
strategy the ROC Government carried out in conflict management of this operation. The 
dissolving of the conflicts in overseas Chinese reparation to Burma exactly benefited from 
the multi-level diplomatic strategy on Overseas Chinese protection. Returning stranded 
overseas Chinese to their registered domiciles was a diplomatic operation, in which the 
right of repatriation was secured thorough bilateral talks and the practice was guided 
through UN intervention. Generally speaking, the ROC Government mainly pushed 
forward the operation into three levels: along with the bilateral talks between two countries 
(the governmental level), it also concentrated on international support (international level) 
and overseas Chinese assistance (non-governmental level). The operation on Chinese?s 
reparation to Burma (1946-1948) was a cooperation between a national government, 
the ROC Government, a transnational organization, the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and overseas Chinese communities, overseas 
Chinese associations in Burma.. In this article, the case study on Chinese?s repatriation to 
Burma (1946-1948) can efficiently demonstrate the flexible multi-level diplomatic strategy 
of the ROC Government, whose firm faith and will to protect the security of every single 
overseas citizen should be positively evaluated even in today.
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1. Introduction
?The problem of displaced persons was an international issue of and after World War II. In 1941, 
after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia produced a large 
mass of overseas Chinese intended to take refuge pouring back to China. At the end of the War, the 
Republic of China (ROC) Government, with the help of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, or UNRRA, offered assistance to overseas Chinese stranded in China those who 
needed assistance in returning to their established domiciles before the war on reentry, which 
was called Chinese?s repatriation. The Chinese?s repatriation was the continuation of the ROC 
Government?s action to relief overseas Chinese in wartime. Also, returning such a large quantity 
of stranded overseas Chinese to their registered domiciles was a unique phenomenon in China?s 
history. 
?The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was an international relief 
agency, whose purpose was to ?plan, co-ordinate, administer or arrange for the administration 
of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of the United Nations 
through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other 
essential services?.1 UNRRA got involved in the project to repatriate overseas Chinese in the late 
1940s. Along with various branch offices of the ROC Government, it registered overseas Chinese 
seeking repatriation, helped provide maintenance expenses for the destitute while they waited for 
permission to return to their prior residences, helped arrange for travel documents and visas, and 
paid for transport.2 The Chinese officials viewed cooperation with UNRRA as a means of leveraging 
China?s equal participation in post-war order in which they would play a central role.3 The efforts 
devoted in the operation to repatriate stranded overseas Chinese demonstrated several important 
points about the ROC Government?s diplomatic policy and its interaction with the world after war.
?In this article, the author is trying to explore the diplomatic conflict management policy of the 
ROC Government from the Chinese?s repatriation to Burma case(1946-1948), a model of multi-level 
diplomatic strategy of the ROC Government, which, was of great importance for understanding 
China? relationship to global currents of development.
2. Literature Review
?The academic study on overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia really has a long history while 
few historical studies were mainly on Chinese?s repatriation of and after World War II. It was 
since 2003, the publishing of The History of Repatriations of Overseas Chinese4, a series archives of 
1 Army Information School. (1946). Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The Public?s 
Library and Digital Archive. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431109a.html (May 1946).
2 Louise W. Holborn (1956). The International Refugee Organization, a Specialized Agency of the United Nations, its History 
and Work 1946-1952. London: Oxford University Press.
3 United Nations Organization. (1945). China Weekly Reports, 1944-5(S-052800053). United Nations Organization Archives 
(July 1945).
4 ??? (2005).?????????? . Taipei: Academia Historica.
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historical documents concerning Chinese?s repatriation after World War II in Taiwan, that more 
and more attention has been paid on this topic. However, in Burma case, the studies still need to 
be improved. The History of Overseas Chinese in Burma edited by The Overseas Community Affairs 
Council (Taiwan)5 and The General Introduction of Overseas Chinese in Burma6are the earliest 
academic works themed with overseas Chinese in Burma but lack introductions of the repatriation 
operation. MENG Xian-jun and JI Zong-an?s research Post-War Myanmar-Chinese Repatriations 
to Myanmar by the National Government: A Preliminary Study comes to a positive evaluation of the 
repatriation operation without a historical perspective7. LING Yan?s An Analysis of Myanmar-Chinese 
Repatriations to Myanmar after World War II is a conflict management study but not a diplomatic 
strategy study of the ROC Government when discussing the repartition case in Burma.8
?Chinese?s repatriation to Burma was a significant operation of the Displace Persons 
Program (DP Program) in China carried out by UNRRA, whose aim was to provide relief and 
resettlement assistance to the displaced persons in China after the war.9 The articles on DP 
Program in China are limited. Allies, Enemies and Aliens Migration and U.S-Chinese Relations, 
1940-1965 10and Text of Proposed China Aid Bill and Background Information on Economic 
Assistance Program for China 11give a rough introduction on Chinese?s repatriation in Southeast 
Asia in order to compare with the limits on Chinese immigration or reentry after wartime in 
the United States. UNRRA in China: 1945-1947 is an official report about the operations and 
programs which UNRRA conducted to reconstruct and rehabilitate China and only gives the 
statistics of DP Program.12 J. Franklin Ray Jr.?s UNRRA in China: A Case Study of the Interplay 
of Interest in a Program of International Aid to an Undeveloped Country 13and Rana Mitter?s 
Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-war China: UNRRA in China, 
1944-7 14demonstrate the organizational relations between China and UNRRA in reconstruction 
and rehabilitation works within China. The efforts of the ROC Government and UNRRA to 
cope with the apocalyptic conditions of late wartime did in fact draw on a combination of 
transnationally inflected ideas combined with local practice. The crossed wires between the 
5 ?????????? (1967). ????? . Taipei: ?????????? .
6 ??? (1988). ?????? . Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Co.
7 ??? , ??? (2010). ??????????????? .? ????? (SOUTH EAST ASIAN STUDIES), Vol.1, No.6, 66-
71.
8 ?? (2014).?????????????? .? ????? (SOUTH EAST ASIAN STUDIES), Vol.1, No.6, 34-40.
9 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (1948). UNRRA in China: 1945-1947. Washington: United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Print.
10 Meredith Leigh Oyen. (2007). Allies, Enemies and Aliens Migration and U. S- Chinese Relations, 1940-1965. (Doctoral thesis, 
Georgetown University, Washington, the United States). Retrieved from http://gradworks.umi.com/33/13/3313029.html.
11 The Committee on Foreign Affairs (1948). Text of Proposed China Aid Bill and Background Information on Economic 
Assistance Program for China. Washington: U.S Government Print.
12 Ibid9.
13 J.Franklin Ray Jr (1947). UNRRA in China: A Case Study of the Interplay of Interest in a Program of International Aid to an 
Undeveloped Country. New York: International Secretariat Institute of Pacific Relations.
14 Rana Mitter (2013). ?Imperialism, Transnationalism, and the Reconstruction of Post-war China: UNRRA in China, 1944-7.? 
Past & Present, Vol.1, No.218, 51-69.
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ROC Government and UNRRA on Chinese?s repatriation to Burma were evident, nevertheless, 
few researches on how the ROC Government interacted and cooperated with UNRRA in 
repatriation have been worked out. The detailed studies are of great significance for understanding 
characteristics of the diplomatic strategy of the ROC Government.
?Based on the archives of the ROC Government15, the national archives of Myanmar16, media 
reports, academic journals, and other historical resources, this article aims to give a comprehensive 
historical introduction of the repatriation operation. Meanwhile, by a deep look at the diplomatic 
conflict negotiations in the repatriation operation, the author is trying to examine, analyze and 
evaluate the diplomatic strategy of the ROC Government. 
3. The Background of Chinese?s Repatriation to Burma
?Since Burma was occupied in the nineteenth century, the British colonizers had been 
implementing a loose immigration policy due to the lack of labor forces in natural resources market, 
thus more and more overseas Indians and Chinese entered Burma.17 The census data of the British 
Burma Government showed that the total number of overseas Chinese in Burma was about 121,000 
in Year 1911, 149,060 in Year 1921, and 193,594 in Year 1931. The data of Year 1941 was lost due to 
the war. It was estimated that the total number of overseas Chinese in Burma reached about 300,000 
by the outbreak of the Pacific War.18
?As immigrants poured into Burma, the employment market got increasingly saturated. The 
conflict between Burmese and foreign residents became more and more intense, and Burmese 
became more and more antiforeign. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, the British Burma 
Government had a try to control the entry of foreigners. Immediately after the outbreak of 
the Pacific War (at the end of Year 1941), namely in early Year 1942, Burma promulgated The 
Registration of Foreigners Act, to lift its formality control over the exit and entry of citizens from 
China, America and the Netherlands for the need of population mobility in wartime.19
?Considering the unrest situation, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia decided to take refuge back 
to China. According to the registration data of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission under 
15 Sincere gratitude goes to Mr. YAN En-Hao, the Doctoral student of National Chengchi University (Taiwan), and Professor 
WANG Kuan-Hsi, the alumni of National Taiwan University, for their assistance on collecting Kuomintang (KMT) 
Government archives in Taiwan.
16 Sincere gratitude goes Ms. Ha Trang Doan Pham, the alumni of Peking University, for her assistance on collecting 
national archives in Myanmar.
17 The reports on Burma Evacuees ?repatriation of India can been referenced to Times of India, ?Burma Evacuees ?Return: 
Mr. J. Mehta?s Statement?, Nov.12, 1945; ?Burma Evacuees ?Repatriation: Arrangements in Bombay?, Dec.7, 1945; ?Burma 
Evacuees: To the Editor?, Jan.28, 1946; ?Burma Evacuees?, Feb.7, 1946; ?Burma Evacuees: General Repatriation after 
Monsoon?, Jul.2, 1946; etc.
18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of Republic of China (1935). ?????????????. Nanking: The 
Report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China;??? (1999).????????? . 
25-27.Taipei: Academia Historica.
19 National Archives Department. The Registration of Foreigners Act. Accession No.21, Series No.15/3 (9), 4-5, Yangon: 
National Archives.
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the ROC Government and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureaus in Fukien (Fujian) Province, 
Kwangtung (Guangdong) Province and Yunnan Province in 1942, the total number of returned 
overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia reached 183,285, and among which 29,391 were from 
Burma.20 The ROC Government found it difficult to settle such a large quantity of returned Chinese 
in a short time but just resorted to sending them to their ancestral hometowns and housed the 
homeless. The returned Chinese from Burma were mainly from Yunnan Province, Fukien(Fujian) 
Province and Kwangtung(Guangdong) Province, among which those returned to their hometowns 
by land transported through Kunming and Chungking?Chongqing?and those headed for their 
hometown by seaway transported through Foochow(Fuzhou), Amoy(Xiamen), Swatow(Shantou), 
and Canton(Guangzhou). 
?At the end of World War II, Burma still remained in an unstable political situation. In 1947, Britain 
and Burma signed the Aung San?Atlee Agreement 21and the Nu?Attlee Agreement 22successively, 
coming to an agreement on the independence of Burma. On January 4th, 1948, Burma officially 
declared its independence, becoming the first former British colony declaring independence outside 
the British Commonwealth after World War II. 
?World War II resulted in an outflow and backflow of population around the world. Since the late 
wartime, UNRRA, governments and immigrant communities set to make preparations for sending 
back of returned foreign residents. In 1944, Chungking (Chongqing) Overseas Chinese Association, 
entrusted by the British consul in Chungking (Chongqing), set to handle the registration of sending 
back of returned overseas Chinese to British overseas territories.23 
4. Emergence of the Conflict in Repatriation Operation
?In early 1946, the Chinese?s repatriation to Burma got into its stride. UNRRA offered 
transportation, including aircraft and ship, to send the overseas Chinese stranded in China back to 
Rangoon. Major participant branch offices of the ROC Government included the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA), the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and the Relief and Rehabilitation 
Office under the Executive Yuan (RROUEY). They took charge of welfare assistances, registration 
affairs and the bilateral connection with Burma. At the same time, the returned overseas Chinese 
established local organizations to cooperate with repatriation arrangements. On February 12, 1946, 
Chungking (Chongqing) took the lead in carrying out the stranded overseas Chinese back to 
Burma.
20 ??? (2003).?????????? (1) (??? ). Taipei: Academia Historica.
21 The Aung San?Atlee Agreement was signed on January 27th, 1947. In the agreement, the Great Britain and Burma agreed 
conclusions as to the methods by which the people of Burma may achieve their independence, either within or without the 
Commonwealth, as soon as possible.
22 The Nu-Attlee Agreement was signed on October 1, 1947 in London. With this agreement Burma regained independence 
from Britain.
23 ???(1951). ???????? . Rangoon: XING SHANG Commerce Association of Overseas Chinese of Myanmar 
Print.
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?China and Burma connect by both land and seaway. The ROC Government and UNRRA also 
planned two routes for the repatriation operation, i.e. land route and sea route. Most of the returned 
overseas Chinese got back to Burma by land or seaway, and a few by plane. On the whole, overseas 
Chinese stranded in Fukien (Fujian) Province and Kwangtung (Guangdong) Province returned 
to Burma by seaway from harbors in Canton (Guangzhou), Swatow (Shantou), Amoy (Xiamen), 
Foochow (Fuzhou), and most of overseas Chinese stranded in Yunnan Province and a few in Sicuan 
(Sichuan) Province, Kweichow (Guizhou) Provinces Province by land.24 
?However, the sea route met a big stumbling block. Although the Burma Government literally 
agreed to accept the overseas Chinese who took refuge in China on reentry, it actually took various 
stonewall strategies. Near the end of the war, the Burma Government asserted that Burma was 
entering into a military government and could hardly afford this operation due to the short of food 
and shelters. Through constant efforts of the ROC Government, the Burma Government approved 
that the former Chinese residents who met with any of the following requirements could reenter 
Burma: 1) having relatives or friends in Burma; 2) being able to assist with the reconstruction 
of Burma, including woodworkers, architectural workers and engineers. In October 1946, after 
UNRRA shipped the first batch of 1,895 overseas Chinese with ?Feng-Ching? to Rangoon, the 
Burma Government suddenly rejected to accept the rest for the reason of government restructuring.
?From November 1946 to May 1947, the sea route had been being halted, and over 12,000 Chinese 
were unable to make the trip but waited at the harbors in Canton (Guangzhou), Swatow (Shantou), 
Amoy (Xiamen), and Foochow (Fuzhou).25 In November 1946, MOFA of the ROC Government 
pointed out that the repatriation operation to Burma was the most difficult one if compared with 
operations of other countries in the Southeast Asia, which include Malaysia, Philippines, North 
Borneo, Siam, Vietnam, and the Dutch East Indies.26
?The sudden action of the Burma Government was closely related to the precarious domestic 
situation. On the one hand, Burmese had already become antiforeign during the colonial time. After 
the war, the nationalism of Burmese, who fought actively for independence, increasingly rose, and 
they became more and more xenophobic. Given this situation, the Burma Government literally 
approved the repatriation while actually delayed as far as possible. 
?On the other hand, Burma was experiencing a regime change from 1946 to 1947, which 
could hinder the policy stability. In late September of 1946, a new Executive Council headed by 
Aung San was established, and the functions and powers of the British Burma?s governor were 
greatly weakened as a result. The new Executive Council was inexperienced actually but eager 
24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1946a).??????????????? . 
National Archives of Republic of China.1946 (10).Taipei: Academia Historica.
25 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1946a).??????????????? . 
National Archives of Republic of China.1946 (10).Taipei: Academia Historica.
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1946b).????????????????
????? . National Archives of Republic of China.1946 (10).Taipei: Academia Historica.
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to formulate new Burma-oriented policies to distinguish itself. Meanwhile, the newly established 
Executive Council had intense conflicts among the parties inside, which included the Anti-Fascist 
People?s Freedom League headed by Aung San, the Patriot Party headed by U Saw, the Thaksin?s 
Party headed by Ba Sheng, the Communist Party, and other parties. In the deep water of fierce 
competition and conflict, parties shifted their responsibilities to each other on overseas Chinese 
affairs. 
?Furthermore, Burma was an important battlefield during World War II, which had been heavily 
destroyed, and the reconstruction was extremely difficult. At that time, ?the country was not 
revitalized, the economic foundation was not consolidated, the industry was not boosted, the traffic 
was bad, the price was high, there were bandits everywhere, and the production declined.?27 In 
1947, a letter from an overseas Chinese who had successfully arrived back at Rangoon was received 
in Canton (Guangzhou), in which he pointed out that Rangoon was indeed worse than it had been 
before the war. Burma now was out of order, in a state of devastation, in industrial stagnation, and 
fully spread with ruins. He also alerted other people who planned to get back to Burma not to expect 
much from Rangoon as before the war.28 All above made Burma reluctant and unable to accept a 
large number of foreign settlers in a short time. 
?The problems of repatriation operation became another excuse. In the official agreement, the 
operation was to send back the foreign settlers who resided in Burma before the war and were 
forced to take refuge in their motherland during the war. However, a few persons, seizing the 
opportunity, pretended to be one of those groups to enter Burma, causing a series problems in the 
community of foreign settlers. That was another reason why the Burma Government rejected to 
accept the second batch of returned foreign settlers.29
?After the interruption of repatriation operation, UNRRA had been trying its best to persuade the 
Burma Government. In November 1946, the Burma Government, through the representative of 
UNRRA in Hong Kong, proposed to designate Burma officials to China to ?identify? the overseas 
Chinese waiting to return to Burma, to make sure there was no one pretending to be. However, the 
ROC Government rejected this proposal. According to MOFA, that intention would affect China?s 
sovereignty.30 Each side stuck to their own views and consequently the repatriation operation came 
to a deadlock for a time. 
27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1946c).????????????????
?????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1946 (13).Taipei: Academia Historica.
28 J.Chan (Sep 1st, 1947). Return to Burma: Repatriation of Overseas Chinese from H.K.?ESCAPED FROM JAPS, South 
China Moring Post, A1.
29 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947a).??????????????
????????????? ;?????????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of 
China.1947 (5). Taipei: Academia Historica.
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947b).???????????????
?????????????????????????? ;????????????????????????? . 
National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (6). Taipei: Academia Historica.
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5. Dissolving Conflict: the Multi-Level Diplomatic Strategy
?The ROC Government paid close attention to the conflict in repatriation operation. In order to 
ease contradictions, MOFA and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commissions did make great efforts. 
According to the DP Program plan, UNRRA and the ROC Government should accomplish their 
tasks respectively in June 1947, when UNRRA would stopped giving assistance to stranded overseas 
Chinese by shutting down the domestic relief and sending back stations. Therefore, the sudden 
delay made all sides anxious. In late December of 1946, CHIANG Kai-shek, the president of the ROC 
Government, ordered by telegramming WANG Shi-jie, the foreign minister, and CHEN Shu-ren, 
the overseas Chinese commissioner, to ?rapidly send back? and give relief to the delayed overseas 
Chinese.31 In January 1947, CHEN Shu-ren sent correspondence to WANG Shi-jie, requiring MOFA 
to accept the Burma Government?s proposal, so as to facilitate the repatriation.32
?Overseas Chinese also presented petitions actively to the government. HUANG Zhi-da, the 
representative of Burma Chinese Association, sent correspondence to WANG Shi-jie, requiring to 
deliver ?a strong protest? against the Britain; LIANG Jin-shan, the representative of Burma Chinese 
Association, sent correspondence to CHIANG Kai-shek, pointing out that the delayed 4,000 overseas 
Chinese who ?suffered heavily? were waiting for nearly three months since registration; WU Bi-
quan, the representative of the overseas Chinese stranded in Canton(Guangzhou) also applied to 
CHIANG Kai-shek for ?actively negotiating with the Burma Government?; etc.33 After receiving 
these requests, Chiang Kai-shek pressed MOFA to ?rapidly handle it.?34
?In order to break the ice, MOFA took ?multi-level diplomatic strategy? in negotiations with Burma.
?The first level was through official channels. Besides the Chinese Embassy directly negotiated 
with the Burma Government in Rangoon, MOFA officially communicated with the British Foreign 
Office through Sino-British diplomatic channels. It also communicated with ZHENG Tian-ci, 
the Chinese Ambassador in the Great Britain, while presenting a note to the British Embassy in 
China, with a view to, in virtue of the instruction of the Britain, the suzerain of Burma, persuading 
the Burma Government to accept the second batch of the returned overseas Chinese. However, 
the relation between Britain and Burma was subtle at that time: although Britain was the colonial 
power of Burma, it was under the stress of Burma?s strong call for independence. In February 
1947, Britain invited Burma delegation to visit London, so as to settle the problem on Burma?s 
independence through negotiations. Upon the request of China, Britain officially consulted with the 
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947c).????????????????
????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China.1947 (9). Taipei: Academia Historica.
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947d).???????????????
?????????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (11).Taipei: Academia 
Historica.
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947e).???????????????
??????????????????????????? ;?????????????????????????
? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (15).Taipei: Academia Historica.
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947f).????????????????
?????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (16).Taipei: Academia Historica.
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Burma Government, but got nowhere in the matters concerning the specific issues, and only got a 
principled commitment from the Burma Government to ?permit the return of the second batch of 
overseas Chinese?.35
?The second level was through international organization. MOFA actively strengthened 
cooperation with UNRRA, which was the key factor driving Burma to change its attitude. As a 
transnational organization, UNRRA functioned outside the official negotiation channels between 
China and Burma, shouldering the responsibility for active communication and coordination. D. 
H. Clarke, the representative of UNRRA in Hong Kong, communicated directly with the Chinese 
Government while sending collision to Rangoon. In January 1947, the ROC Government, under 
the pressure, in order to protect the interests and rights of overseas Chinese, took the lead to give 
in. Considering both the sovereignty principle and the interests of overseas Chinese, China could 
only accept the Burma Government to send officials to ?assist? or ?help? UNRRA in this operation 
but could hardly accept the officials of the Burma Government to be main directors.36 On behalf of 
the ROC Government, Clarke conveyed that China agreed if Burma sent officials to China only for 
?assistance? and the Burmese side accepted.37 On January 16, Clarke flew to Nanking (Nanjing) to 
have a face-to-face talk about the repatriation issue with MOFA.38 Both sides reached an agreement. 
The repatriation operation met a turnaround. 
?The coordination role of UNRRA had prevented the two sides from conflicts. Since then, both the 
Chinese side and the Burmese side tended to deliver messages by UNRRA. UNRRA (referred to 
as the International Refugee Organization later) had been participating throughout the Sino-Burma 
negotiations, becoming an indispensable driving force in repatriation.
?The third level was through non-governmental forces. The public diplomatic activities contributed 
a lot to the Sino-Burma negotiations. The ROC Government had clearly put forwards the idea of 
?public diplomacy? not later than the Sino-Japanese War period.39 In this conflict, the general 
consulate of China in Rangoon asked LI Wen-zhen, the president of the Chinese Commerce 
Association in Burma, GUO Zong-ji and ZHANG Zhen-yu, leaders of Fukien (Fujian) overseas 
Chinese in Burma, to privately lobby the person in charge of the Burmese side.40 During the 
negotiations, leaders of overseas Chinese associations in Burma actively informed the Chinese 
35 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947g).????????????????
??????? ;??????????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (17).
Taipei: Academia Historica.
36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947h).????????????????
???????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (17).Taipei: Academia Historica.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947i).????????????????
????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (18).Taipei: Academia Historica.
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947j).????????????????
????  Clarke ????????? ;??????????????????????????? . National Archives 
of Republic of China. 1947 (19).Taipei: Academia Historica.
39 ????1938?. ???????? .????? (China Japan War Chinese Magazine Book), No.2, 10-13.
40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947k).????????????????
?????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (19).Taipei: Academia Historica.
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side of the attitude of Burma. For example, CHEN Zong-zhen, the member of Rangoon Commerce 
Association, revealed the schedule of U Thein Maung and introduced the domestic situation of the 
Burma Government to the ROC Government.41 After the delay of repatriation, WU Bi-quan, the 
representative of Kwangtung (Guangdong) overseas Chinese, flew to Burma to put forward a plan 
for overseas Chinese group maintenance.42 Since Qing Dynasty, overseas Chinese had laid a solid 
social foundation in Burma. The lobbying by overseas Chinese in support to the ROC Government 
had made a certain difference in settling the conflict of repatriation.
?Through the active coordination of UNRRA, U Thein Maung, the chief delegate of Burma, with 
HONG Jin-ming, the counselor of China, and HU Mao-xuan, the secretary, arrived at Amoy (Xiamen) 
in April 1947, starting identifying overseas Chinese. According to the estimated statistics in late 
December of 1947, the number of qualified Chinese was: 1,916 persons from Foochow (Fuzhou), 
1,330 persons from Amoy (Xiamen), 1,245 persons from Swatow (Shantou), 251 persons from 
Canton (Guangzhou), 75 persons from Shanghai, 15 persons from Haikou, 2 persons from Taiwan, 
and the total number of qualified overseas Chinese was 6,834.43
?Facing the pressure to protect the interests of overseas Chinese, MOFA behaved with a certain 
audacity and a prudent realism. Rather than stubborn in the traditional diplomatic way, it not only 
made a wise concession but also cooperated with international organizations and non-government 
forces. Finally, the deadlock in the repatriation operation was broken, and valuable achievements in 
diplomacy had been made. 
?In the middle of 1947, the independence of Burma became obvious. The flood of overseas Indians 
and Chinese into Burma aroused controversy. Burma started tightening the immigration and exit-
entry system by law. In May 1947, the Executive Council of Burma resumed the Alien Registration 
Law promulgated in 1940, and officially notified China, the United States and the Netherlands of the 
cancellation of exemption. HSU Shao-chang, consul general of China in Rangoon, and the Chinese 
Commerce Association in Burma lodged protests44, which temporarily delayed the implementation 
of the registration system.45 On June 13, 1947, the Burma authorities promulgated The Burma 
Immigration (Emergency Provisions) Act. In accordance with the Act, any alien shall not enter the 
Union of Burma without an entry permit issued by the Burma Immigration Office or a passport with 
visa, and the violators will be expelled. The enforcement of the Act marked that Burma terminated 
the incentive immigration policy in the colonial period, and turned to a restrictive immigration 
41 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947l).???????????????
?????????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (23).Taipei: Academia 
Historica.
42 Wong Li(1947).???????????? .???? , 13-14.
43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1947m).???????????????
????????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1947 (22).Taipei: Academia Historica.
44 National Archives Department. Burma Chinese Chamber of Commerce to the Secretary of Defense and External Affairs 
Department.  Accession No.21, Series No.15/3(9), 40, Yangon, Myanmar.
45 National Archives Department. Shao- Chang Hsu to U Shwe Baw.  Accession No.21, Series No.15 /3(9), 41-43, Yangon, 
Myanmar.
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policy. At that time, the border between Burma and Yunnan Province of China was not officially 
delimited, and whether the Act was applicable to the overseas Chinese entering Burma by land 
transportation would directly affect a large number of overseas Chinese. The consulate general of 
China in Rangoon raised an objection, made a qualified statement, and negotiated with the Burmese 
side through repeated talks.46 The overseas Chinese?s repatriation to Burma by land transportation 
was not significantly interrupted until the middle of 1948. 
?On January 14, 1948, Burma achieved independent and established the Union of Burma. 
Thereafter, the Burma Government tightened the immigration policy to slow down the progress of 
overseas Chinese repatriation by seaway again. Then in May 1948, the Communist Party of Burma 
provoked the civil war and claimed that the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma 
would carry out a strict inspection of overseas Chinese by land transportation.47 In early 1949, the 
ROC Government sent back two batches of overseas Chinese to Burma, 978 persons in total, and 
the rest of 2,000 persons were planned to be sent back by June.48 However, it was regrettable that 
at that time both the Burma and ROC Government were suffering an internal intense strife and 
were unable to continue the operation, thus the repatriation had to be required to stop. On June 
4th, the last batches of 63 returned overseas Chinese arrived at Rangoon,49 which marked that the 
repatriation operation of overseas Chinese to Burma launched by the ROC Government came to the 
end. 
?From 1946 to 1949, the ROC Government had sent back over 9,000 overseas Chinese to Burma 
by seaway in total. According to the data, about 4,000 returned overseas Chinese who had passed 
the inspection had not been sent back. That is to say, the ROC Government had just completed 70% 
or so of the intended goal.50 Also, some overseas Chinese stranded in Fukien (Fujian) Province and 
Kwangtung (Guangdong) Province were transferred to Yunnan Province during waiting, of which 
the figure was difficult to calculate. According to the available statistics on repatriation operation 
by land transportation, from January 1946 to September 1947, the number of returned overseas 
Chinese sent back to Burma by truck by the Kunming Refugee Transport Station, the Office of 
Sending back of Overseas Chinese in Kunming and the Office in western Yunnan reached 3,839 in 
total.51
46 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1948).????????????????
???? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1948 (10).Taipei: Academia Historica.
47 National Archives Department. Minutes of the meetings held in the Office Room of the Permanent Secretary, Foreign Office. 
Accession No.36, Series No.15 /3 (15), Yangon, Myanmar.
48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1949a).????????????????
????????????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1949 (2).Taipei: Academia Historica.
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of National Government of the Republic of China (1949b).????????????63???
????? . National Archives of Republic of China. 1949 (5).Taipei: Academia Historica.
50 Statistics from??? (1951).???????? . Rangoon: XING SHANG Commerce Association of Overseas Chinese of 
Myanmar Print; ??? (2003).?????????? (1)(??? ), 10-17. Taipei: Academia Historica.
51 The Relief and Rehabilitation Office under the Executive Yuan of National Government, Republic of China.??????
?????? .Collection historical archives of Republic of China, Vol 3, Series 5, Nanking, People?s Republic of China.
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?In addition, some overseas Chinese got back to Burma by sporadically repatriation operations 
excluded in the concentrated ones, of which the figure was difficult to calculate. It was estimated 
that the number of returned overseas Chinese who were actually sent back to Burma by the ROC 
Government by seaway, land transportation or plane reached about 15,000. The Annals of Overseas 
Chinese in Burma from Taiwan also points out that UNRRA ?had sent back over 15,000 overseas 
Chinese to Burma within more than two years?.52 The number of overseas Chinese in Burma 
reached the pre-war level in the early 1950s. It should be noted that the returned overseas Chinese 
sent back by the ROC Government were those who were qualified only. 
6. Conclusion
?World War II resulted in a huge international migration, and the Pacific War had directly affected 
residents in the Southeast Asia. The repatriation operation on overseas Chinese to Burma was a 
typical case which was unprecedented in respect of scale in modern history of China. Although 
the operation was left incomplete, in all, the efforts to repatriated stranded overseas Chinese 
demonstrate the significant characteristics of diplomatic strategy of the Republic of China.
?The period from 1946 to 1949 was not a good time for the repatriation operation when both 
the Chinese side and the Burmese side were caught into numerous difficulties: Burma was 
suffering a turbulent political situation and recovering from the Pacific War while China was 
suffering a weak central government and facing too great an internal threat from the Chinese 
Communists. Considering the situations of China and Burma, the repatriation operation was worth 
being positively evaluated. The ROC Government highly emphasized the operation with a view 
to protecting and relieving overseas Chinese in spite of external and internal troubles, and had 
successfully finished 70% of the intended goal.
?The dissolving of the conflict of repatriation operation on overseas Chinese to Burma directly 
benefited from the ?multi-level diplomatic strategy? of the ROC Government. MOFA did not stick 
in the mud when suffering a setback in the traditional approach but actively tried a ?multi-level? 
approach, which means that resolving the conflict not only by official approach but also with the help 
of UNRRA and the non-governmental force. Concerned about the interests of overseas Chinese, 
MOFA acted actively in negotiations with a flexible and practical attitude to consider both the 
principle and the reality, making a certain compromise when in dilemma. Finally, the repatriation 
operation was carried out in numerous difficulties. 
?The handling of the conflict in repatriation operation of overseas Chinese to Burma by the 
ROC Government showed the positive interoperation between diplomacy and overseas Chinese 
affairs. The position of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission under the ROC Government 
had been constantly adjusted. It was subordinate to MOFA first, and then became subordinate to 
the Executive Yuan, equally with MOFA at the same executive level. This reflected that the ROC 
52 ?????????? (1967).????? . Taipei: ??????????
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Government had been paying increasing attention to overseas Chinese affairs. The division of the 
diplomatic work was clear: MOFA acted ?outside the country?, and the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission ?inside the country?. The former took charge of diplomatic negotiations on overseas 
Chinese affairs, and the latter took charge of relief on overseas Chinese refugees. The Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Commission could not solve the overseas Chinese affairs problem without the 
cooperation of MOFA, and MOFA was supervised and urged by the Overseas Chinese Affairs 
Commission when handling overseas Chinese related problem. This marked that the government 
of China in modern times had basically completed the exploration of the functional relationship 
between diplomacy and overseas Chinese affairs.
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